This paper examines the role of a policymaker in macroeconomic outcomes. A standard model of aggregate supply is linked with an interest rate policy rule that targets in ‡ation and output stability. The role of the policymaker centers on using policy rule targets in a countercyclical manner to encourage e¢cient business cycle outcomes (price and output stability). The model produces the following results: 1) In the presence of supply and demand shocks, there are pareto improving combinations of in ‡ation and output targets; 2) Outside the optimal combinations of in‡ation and output targeting, increasing emphasis on an in ‡ation (output) target destabilizes output (in ‡ation); 3) In the presence of a demand shock, aggressive application of countercyclical policy is a pareto improving result. On the other hand, a similar policy tack when a supply shock is present results in a trade-o¤ between the two policy targets; and 4) An aggressive policy creates interest rate volatility and is generally inconsistent with policy implementation designed to smooth interest rates. Therefore, pareto improving results only apply to in ‡ation and output stability.
Introduction
A central macroeconomic policy concern is providing conditions that encourage e¢cient macroeconomic outcomes -full employment of resources with price stability. 1 Among the research questions explored is how monetary policy rule changes a¤ect business cycle ‡uctuations (Sargent 1999; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000) . This paper focuses on the proper role for policymakers in this environment. We link a well known aggregate supply function with a policy rule to determine the possible trade-o¤s various policy targets pose (Fuhrer and Moore 1995) . More generally, this paper determines how di¤erent policy target mixes a¤ect the stochastic behavior of the business cycle.
Our model of business cycle behavior is consistent with Friedman (1968) , Phelps (1968) and Lucas (1972 Lucas ( , 1973 . The natural rate of output is the equilibrium in both high and low in ‡ation variability scenarios. A high in ‡ation period has the same average business cycle volatility as a low in ‡ation period (Barro 1976 ). The model is limited to business cycle ‡uctuations, however. The high variability of in ‡ation can be considered socially undesirable, since there is some evidence that high in ‡ation volatility lowers the natural rate of output (see Footnote 6) .
The role of a policymaker rests in the application of countercyclical policy. We assume that the policymaker's policy rule -an interest rate rule -targets in ‡ation and output stability (Taylor 1993) . Not surprisingly, emphasizing output stabilization produces lower variability in output, while emphasizing in ‡ation stabilization produces lower variability in in ‡ation. More importantly, our …nd-ings show that there is no general policy trade-o¤ between emphasizing in ‡ation (in ‡ation target) or output (output target) stabilization. 2 Indeed, there is a range of values the interest rate response can take that reduces both in ‡ation and output variability (see Cecchetti and Ehrmann 1999) .
These pareto improving possibilities are feasible only up to a point. In ‡ation or output targeting reduces the variability of in ‡ation and output respectively, although with decreasing e¤ectiveness. When considering the "crossover e¤ect" the results show that failure to achieve the optimal value for the other target produces instability. In this instance a trade-o¤ between policy outcomes occurs. 1 We de…ne the full employment of resources as a situation where output equals its natural rate. Price stability can be de…ned as the achievement of a speci…c prespeci…ed in ‡ation target (see Goodhart and Vie nas 1994) or when citizens no longer account for actual or prospective in ‡ation in their decision making (Volcker and Gyothen 1992: 176) . 2 On the other hand, Taylor (1979 Taylor ( , 1980 ) …nds a trade-o¤.
We also …nd that the magnitude of the policy (interest rate) response to the deviations in these targets contributes to more e¢cient outcomes for either output or in ‡ation Gertler 1999, 2000; ). What matters is the aggressive application of countercyclical policy. 3 Care must be exercised, however, since an aggressive policy tack creates greater volatility in interest rates and is generally inconsistent with a policy that emphasizes smooth movements in interest rates.
The policymaker role is also extended to situations when either supply or demand shocks are present. 4 In the presence of demand shocks a countercyclical policy emphasis (on either target) results in e¢cient business cycle outcomes. If supply shocks are present, then emphasis on price stability over output stability destabilizes output further.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we specify our model. Section 3 examines the feasibility of emphasizing in ‡ation targets, output targets, or a mixture of both. Section 4 solves the model and derives the relationships between the policy rule and in ‡ation and output stability. In Section 5 we specify the optimal policy target emphasis. Section 6 extends the model to situations where supply or demand shocks are present. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Model
The model contains three components: an aggregate supply function, a demand function (IS curve), and a policy rule (Taylor rule).
Aggregate Supply Function
The aggregate supply function is based on Lucas (1972 Lucas ( , 1973 5 . We modify the model to account for supply shocks. At time t ¡ 1, …rms forecast the course 3 In an examination of policy rules and macroeconomic outcomes in the United States , Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) …nd empirical support for this proposition: greater weight assigned to in ‡ation stabilization is consistent with greater macroeconomic stability. 4 The previous …ndings allow demand and supply shocks to occur simultaneously. 5 Because there is a proliferation of information about policy (interest rates and monetary aggregates) the Lucas supply curve has been criticized for not providing a valid justi…cation for expectation (information) rigidity. As a result there are variants of this model that apply to wage contracting which is assumed in some quarters to be a more plausible rigidity (Gray 1976; Fischer 1977; Taylor 1980 ). However, we believe the Lucas supply curve contains useful theoretical justi…cations for rigidity. Among them are: 1) the practical costs of information acquisition can be prohibitively high; 2) the vast multitude of information of varying quality; 3) of monetary policy and in ‡ation. However, they cannot easily disentangle the variation between relative and general demand shocks. The supply curve is of the following form:
where y t is the log of output, y n t is the natural rate of output de…ned as ® +¯t, and ¼ t is price in ‡ation, E t¡1 ¼ t is expected in ‡ation, and u 1t is an (iid) supply shock.
It is assumed that agents use all available relevant information up to t ¡ 1 in predicting future in ‡ation. Speci…cally, changes in output depend on the degree to which …rms can disentangle relative from general (in ‡ation) demand shocks (see Pigou 1929) . 6 The parameter a 1 captures this relationship. Intuitively, the supply function possesses features introduced by Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) . Speci…cally, any in ‡ation rate can be associated with the average rate of change in output. Both high and low in ‡ation environments are associated with output growing at its natural rate (y n t ).
The IS Curve
The IS curve -the demand function -that we employ reinforces the use of citizen expectations and also provides an avenue for real interest rates (policy). Traditional "Keynesian" analysis suggests that the combination of a lower price level and the Pigou e¤ect stimulates output (Tobin 1975 ). But, we believe future expectations about personal consumption play a role where the expectation of higher future consumption leads citizens to consume more currently (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) .
Real interest rates also play a role. De ‡ation expectations encourage a shift away from capital to money and thereby raise real interest rates (Mundell 1963) .
the recent work on adaptive learning is most directly tied with models that emphasize imperfect information (Evans and Honkpohja 2001); and 4) informational mistakes (rigidities) precede any institutional application. Contract rigidities, for example, a¤ect policy neutrality depending on the accuracy of the information used in making in ‡ation forecasts. 6 Although this model is silent on the subject (Lucas assumes that it is a deterministic trend), the possibility exists that the natural rate of output (y Higher real interest rates reduce investment and consumption, the latter re ‡ecting intertemporal substitution.
These arguments that emphasize substitution e¤ects and citizen expectations make a IS function based on microfoundations appropriate. For these reasons we use McCallum and Nelson's (1999) IS speci…cation:
where r t is nominal interest rate, E t ¼ t+1 is expected in ‡ation one period ahead, E t y t+1 is expected output one period ahead, and u 2t is an (iid) demand shock. Again, it is assumed that agents use all available relevant information up to time t in predicting future in ‡ation. 7 The expression,
2) is the real interest rate.
The Policy Rule
Since aggregate supply and demand depend on the expectations over the course of policy, a policy rule can be used. It is assumed that policy follows some stable probability. 8 Furthermore, citizens understand the policy rule and augment their behavior to include the expected gains or losses implied by the policy rule and policymaker behavior (Lucas 1976) .
We use an interest rate rule popularized by Taylor (1993 Taylor ( , 1994 . He argues that his interest rate rule is related to the quantity theory of money. 9 The "Taylor rule" 10 has the following form:
Note that this is di¤erent than when expectations are taken in the supply curve (E t v. E t¡1 ). Having identical expectation operators does not change the results. 8 See Romer (2000) for a discussion of linking a policy rule with the IS curve. 9 Barro (1976) uses a money rule in his paper which would appear to have more direct relation with (2.1). Yet, since the Taylor rule is derivative of the quantity theory, we believe it is also suitable for inclusion with (2.1). In addition, because there are plausible arguments that policymakers follow rules similar to Taylor (1993) or Gertler (1999, 2000) , a more powerful description of the policymaker's role is achieved. 10 The relation between the Quantity Theory of Money and the "Taylor Rule" can be shown in the following way. Drop the time subscripts for convenience and start with the traditional identity for the Quantity Theory of Money:
where the variables (money (m), velocity (v), the price level (p), and output (y) respectively) are in log form. Since velocity can be expressed as a function of interest rates (r) and output where r t is a nominal interest rate that the policymaker can in ‡uence, r ¤ is the real interest rate as de…ned in (2.2). 11 
Policymaker Emphasis: Price and Output Stability
The coe¢cients c 1 and c 2 represent the aggressiveness that policymakers possess in stopping in ‡ationary (de ‡ationary) pressures -whether from output deviations above (below) the natural rate (c 1 (y t ¡ y n t )) or in ‡ation rates above (below) a prespeci…ed target (c 2 (¼ t ¡ ¼ ¤ )).
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For clarity we de…ne an aggressive policy role in the following way. Positive values of c 1 and c 2 indicate a willingness to raise (lower) nominal interest rates in response to excess demand (in ‡ation) -whether it is when output is above (below) its natural rate (y t R y 
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(y) substitute f (r; y) for v in (1) and note that f is a linear function:
Now, factorize the interest rate: r = q (m; p; y) and note that q is a linear function. To ensure the stationarity of both the price level (p) and output (y), take the …rst di¤erence of the price level (¼) and subtract the trend of output (y n ) from output (y ¡ y n ). Assume that all variables are in a linear relationship and we have (2.3).
11 Sargent and Wallace (1975) argue that interest rate rules are price (in ‡ation) indeterminate. Barro (1989) and McCallum and Nelson (1999) have challenged this claim. The indeterminacy result is not robust to, among other things, the inclusion of nominal variables to the interest rate rule.
McCallum and Nelson (1999, footnote 27) show that when output is not modeled as a constant, an IS curve of the form (2:2) can produce indeterminacies in the price level. Since we treat output as part of a deterministic trend (y n t = ® +¯t) the IS curve has an indeterminacy when the coe¢cient b 3 > 1 in (2:2). The results can be provided by the authors upon request. 12 As a proxy for a policy rule such as (2.3) Granato (1996) uses the ratio of a short-term interest rate (the federal funds rate) to the annual in ‡ation rate. Aggressive countercyclical reputations or policymakers maintain a federal funds rate ratio that is greater than unity. On the other hand, nonaggressive countercyclical reputations or policymakers allow the federal funds rate ratio to fall below unity. 13 Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) refer to (2.3) as a "backward looking" rule. They estimate c 1 ; c 2 in (2.3) for the United States (1960:1-1996:4). They …nd that c 1 ranges between 0.0 to . 39 
Feasibility
One issue in stabilizing prices or output is whether a trade-o¤ exists when trying stabilize either. In ‡ation targeting is thought to destablize output while an output target destabilizes prices. We address this issue directly by examining the limiting behavior of c 1 and c 2 on in ‡ation and output. Consider …rst the equilibrium in ‡ation rate. From (8:8) (see Appendix 1) we have:
If we substitute for J 0 ; J 1 ; J 2 ; and J 3 and assume b 3 = 1 then 14 :
Now simplify:
where c 2 6 = 0 and
. From here, we can see that c 2 has the expected e¤ect on in ‡ation, namely the policymaker can reach the in ‡ation target: lim
On the other hand, c 1 does not reach the in ‡ation target:
For the output level, we can rewrite (2.1) as:
and again manipulate terms:
and c 2 ranges between .86 to 2.55. They conclude that the United States monetary authority moved to nearly an exclusive focus on stabilizing in ‡ation. 14 McCallum and Nelson (1999) assume b 3 = 1 (see Footnote 11).
The limiting value for c 1 is as expected where output settles at its natural rate:
However, c 2 produces greater ine¢ciency with the addition of the supply shock, u 1t : lim
In both cases, it is clear that it is not feasible to target in ‡ation or ouput exclusively. 15 However, the possibility exists that an aggressive response to both in ‡ation and output deviations produces pareto improving results -up to a point. We discuss this in Section 5.
If there is an exclusive focus on in ‡ation or output targeting, then the object of the target will be obtained. The limiting result, however, for crossover e¤ects produces ine¢ciency.
The Policy Rule and the Business Cycle
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The natural rate constraint of the supply curve shifts the relevant business cycle focus to the second moments of in ‡ation and output. Since the volatility of the policy rule can also be a concern for policymakers, we include the interest rate variance as well (Mishkin 1999 ).
Aggregate Variability
Assuming that both supply and demand shocks (u 1t ; u 2t ) have regular properties, the variation of the expectation di¤erence of in ‡ation can be represented as
17 According to equation (8:11), we have:
15 Gali (2001) shows that as c 2 ! 1, the variance of output and in ‡ation approach zero. Our results contradict this. 16 All additional derivations are presented in Appendix 1. 17 Note that
To calculate the variance of the output level, subtract the natural rate of output from both sides of (2:1), square both sides and take the theoretical expectation.
The interest rate variance follows from (8:16):
Our model makes an explicit link between the policy rule (2:3) and the model of the business cycle ((2:1) ; (2:2)). We examine two policy issues in this section: 1) the relationship between a policy that targets price (c 2 ) or output (c 1 ) stability on price stability (¾ 2 ¼ ); and 2) the relationship between a policy that targets price or output stability on output stability ¡ ¾ 2 y ¢ .
The Policy Rule and the Variance of In ‡ation
Consider the relationship between a policy that emphasizes price stability and price stability (¾ 2 ¼ ). Take the derivative of equation (8:11) with respect to c 2 :
As might be expected a negative relationship exists. Higher values of c 2 reduce the variance of in ‡ation. This relationship is displayed in Figure 1 . On the other hand, consider the relationship between the weight assigned to stabilizing output and (¾ 2 ¼ ). Take the derivative of equation (8:11) with respect to c 1 :
The sign of (4:5) is undetermined. This condition tells us that we should be careful of setting the value of c 1 given the value of c 2 : In order to minimize the variance of in ‡ation, c 1 should be set under the above condition. Accordingly we know that the variance of in ‡ation can be minimized by setting c 1 to some optimal value. Figure 1 indicates that, with these parameter values, the variance of in ‡ation is at a minimum when c 1 < 1. As c 1 ! 20, the stabilizing e¤ect of c 2 is reduced, but this added volatility levels o¤.
The Policy Rule and the Variance of Output
Now consider the relationship between a policy that emphasizes output stability and the e¤ect on the variance of output ¡ ¾ 2 y ¢ . Take the derivative of equation (4:2) with respect to c 1 :
Again, a negative relationship exists. This result makes intuitive sense since ¾ The relationship between the weight assigned to stabilizing in ‡ation and the output variance is more complex. The …rst order condition of ¾ 2 y with respect to c 2 is:
19 With the exception of c 1 and c 2 , all parameter values are the same as in Figure 1 .
As with the other crossover relationship -
-we must …rst take into account the other policy weight. We set the value of c 2 , given the value of c 1 , to minimize the output variance. We plot the variance of output and the value of c 2 given the value of c 1 to demonstrate the relationship. According to the …rst order equation, (4.7) above, we know that the variance of output can be minimized by setting c 2 < 10. This is con…rmed in Figure 2. 
Summary
To summarize brie ‡y, the e¢cient outcomes, in terms of minimizing in ‡ation and output variability, depend on the size and sign of c 1 and c 2 . The sign and magnitude of these two parameters bears directly on real interest rates which in ‡uences in ‡ation and output. Consequently, the degree to which policymakers maintain positive real interest rates results in more e¢cient (smaller) values of ¾ There are added complications in these results. It is misleading to conclude that an aggressive policy tack as noted in Proposition 4.1 is the dominant strategy for a policymaker. Even though we expect policies that target in ‡ation and output stabilization to deliver the most e¢cient results for price
it is the case that these relationships are curvilinear (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 ). We summarize this result in Proposition 4.2. A …nal issue issue we consider is the crossover policy e¤ect. Propostion 4.3 summarizes: Proposition 4.3. As in Proposition 3.2, the crossover policy e¤ects are destabilizing when the optimal value is not used. The e¤ect is more severe between the weight on the in ‡ation target and output stability.
The Optimal Policymaker Role
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, there is a literature on how c 1 and c 2 can be endogenized. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), for example, have shown that the policymaker's objective function re ‡ects the private trade-o¤s in emphasizing output and in ‡ation stabilization. These potentially competing goals -at least in the short-run -re ‡ect shifting political pressures. Political pressures and the weights in the policymakers objective function are the private information of the policymaker. The issue is how citizens try to infer these weights from the actions taken by the monetary authority.
We assume that citizens can and do understand the policy rule and that private informational concerns are minimal. In this scenario, the problem policymakers face is to choose a time path for the interest rate to engineer time paths of the targeted variables (y n t ; ¼ ¤ ) that minimize their loss function. The business cycle consequences are direct. For example, West (1988) shows that if the policymaker chooses a time path for interest rates that is persistenthighly autoregressive -this translates into persistent behavior for output. The reason is that for any model that has some price rigidity, persistent behavior in interest rates corresponds to persistence in real interest rates. This has implications for consumption and investment, and -as we have shown -in ‡ation and output stability.
The Policymaker Loss Function
The previous results show that emphasizing both price and output stability can produce stability in the same target and the crossover target. We assume that policymakers try to stabilize in ‡ation (4:1), output (4:2), and interest rates (4:3) in the following loss function:
where ®;°; and¸are the weights that policymakers assign to each in ‡ation, output, and interest stability respectively (Rudebusch and Svensson 1999). While we believe that interest rate stability is a secondary goal for policymakers, the inclusion of this term allows for consideration of policymaker competence -associated with smooth interest rate behavior (Mishkin 1999 ) -as well as accounting for …nancial market e¤ects such as an inverted yield curve. Since in‡ation and output stability are a primary concern, it assumed that policymakers try to minimize L t with respect to c 1 and c 2 :
After obtaining the …rst and second order conditions 20 in (5:2), the optimal values of c 1 and c 2 are:
and,
The optimal policy target weights have various properties. Consider c 20 The …rst order condition with respect to c 1 given c 2 is:
The second order condition with respect to c 2 given c 1 is:
¤ª ¡1 :
21 From (3.2), when c 2 = 0, the equilibrium in ‡ation rate is indeterminate.
Note, however, that if policymakers care relatively more about interest rate stability (¸> ®;¸>°), then both c ¤ 1 and c ¤ 2 will be small. Policymakers always face a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the business cycle or interest rates. Since b 2 represents the response of output to the real interest rate, small values of b 2 indicate that the real interest rate has little e¤ect on the output level. As a result the interest rate rule is less e¤ective in stabilizing in ‡ation, output, or both. In this situation, where b 2 is small, a second best strategy would be for policymakers to focus on interest rate stability. Lower values of c 
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The grid shows that the in ‡ation variance is smallest when ® > 100 and°< 4.
(Figure 3 about here)
Alternatively, Figure 4 displays the variance of output under the optimal policy. Using the same parameter ranges for policymaker weights, the grid shows that the minimum output variance occurs when°> 20 and ® < 50.
(Figure 4 about here)
The interest rate variance under the optimal policy is shown in Figure 5 . As might be expected, as ® !°! 0, then ¾ 2 i ! 0. The intuition is that large weights in each policy target implies sharp increases or decreases in interest rates. Therefore, pareto improving results must be con…ned exclusively to consideration of in ‡aton and output stability. There is always a trade-o¤ between an aggressive policy tack and interest rate volatility. we see that as ® increases both the variance of in ‡ation and output decrease. However, the variance of output falls to a minimum of :14 but then 22 For Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 , and 7 the baseline parameters are: ¾ 2 u 1 = 1; ¾ 2 u 2 = 1; b 2 = ¡1; and a 1 = 10. 23 We normalize for the interest rate variance preference (¸= 1) since we believe that the other two preferences are primary for policymakers.
begins to increase as ® continues to increase. The variance of in ‡ation continues to fall but at a decreasing rate.
( Figure 6 about here) This result also holds when°is increased f(®;°;¸) = (25; [1; 30] ; 1)g. Figure  7 displays that the variance of output and in ‡ation decrease, but that the variance of in ‡ation begins to increase after a minimum is reached. In addition, a continual increase in°decreases the variance of output to fall, but with decreasing e¤ect.
( Figure 7 about here)
Pareto Improving Policy Results
These results show that the optimal policymaker role rests in targeting both in‡ation and output. In contrast to an exclusive policy focus on in ‡ation targeting (Dabelle 1999) , we …nd that pareto improving results can occur provided policymakers work within a range of feasible values for c The e¤ect works for both preferences (®;°) ; the attendant optimal policy weights (c . What is key is the behavior of ® and°. Equation (4:2) is the variance of output in our model. With a modi…cation for the optimal policy weights we can express the optimal variance of the output level:
where we know that c
1. In order to …nd the pareto improving interval of ®; get the …rst order condition of ¾ ¤2 y with respect to ®:
(5.6) 24 There is some empirical evidence that associates in ‡ation targeting with pareto improving outcomes in in ‡ation and output stability (see Cecchetti and Ehrmann 1999) . Therefore, the minimum ¾ ¤2 y given ® would be:
Expression (5:7) shows that if a policymaker's preference parameter for in ‡ation stabilization (®) satsi…es the inequality ® < ® ¤ , then policymakers can improve the e¢ciency of both in ‡ation variance and output variance by increasing ® ! ® ¤ . On the other hand when ® > ® ¤ , the trade-o¤ between the in ‡ation and output variance is salient. A decrease in the variance of in ‡ation raises the variance of output level in this situation.
The translation from the preference to the policy weight is direct. We know that c
. Therefore, the pareto improving area can occur with c
But, it is also clear that ® ¤ and c ¤ 2 depend on the preference for output stabilization -°. After some adjustments to (5:8), we have:
Consequently, as long as°is small enough, an increase in a positive c 
Optimal Policy in the Presence of Exogenous Shocks
Proposition 4.1 points to an aggressive policymaker role, while Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 are explicit in how this aggressive role should be implemented. In this model, a policymaker's role is to: a) target in ‡ation or output or both; and b) be willing to raise (lower) nominal short-run interest rates su¢ciently to raise (lower) real interest rates.
There is empirical support for these assertions. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) …nd that supply and demand shocks contribute less volatility as policymakers follow and maintain an aggressive policy stance. However, their model of aggregate supply is New Keynesian where our model is Classical. In the spirit of Poole (1970) we examine the robustness of the policymaker role within alternative exogenous environments.
Unexpected Demand Shocks and Policymaker Response
The e¤ect of unexpected demand shocks can be determined by the policymaker's loss function with respect to c 1 and c 2 and also setting ¾
(6.1)
we have:
Since the …rst order conditions for c 1 and c 2 are identical, the optimal values are related to each other. Here we focus on in ‡ation targeting and select c ¤ 2 under the following condition:
(6.3) Figure 8 displays the variance of in ‡ation and output when the preference for greater in ‡ation stability increases. 25 The policymaker weights for the in‡ation variance (®), output variance (°), and interest rate variance (¸) are: 
Unexpected Supply Shocks and Policymaker Response
The e¤ect of unexpected supply shocks can be determined by the policymaker loss function with respect to c 1 and c 2 and also setting ¾ 2 u 2 = 0. Consider …rst
(6.5) As in the demand shock case, the …rst order conditions for c 1 and c 2 are identical. Again, we choose c
Unlike demand shocks, supply shocks lead to trade-o¤s after an initial pareto improving range is exceeded. 26 Using the same values for ®;°; and¸, Figure  9 shows that as the preference for in ‡ation targeting increases, the variance of output gradually goes up after initially falling. 27 There is also a diminishing marginal return to stabilizing in ‡ation. The same trade-o¤ holds (not shown here) when the preference for output stabilization (°) goes up.
( Figure 9 about here) 
Conclusion
This paper describes a policymaker's role in business cycle ‡uctuations. Policymakers in ‡uence business cycle ‡uctuations through the adjustment of short-term interest rates. We argue that, as a general rule, the proper role for the policymaker is to adjust interest rates for countercyclical purposes to stabilize both in ‡ation 26 For Figure 9 the baseline parameters are: ¾ and output. Our model indicates e¢cient business cycle outcomes occur when an aggressive policy stance is followed. More speci…cally, nominal interest rates should be changed so that real interest rates, or a ratio of short-term interest rates to annual in ‡ation, adjust in the direction that maintains the integrity of in ‡ation and output targets.
While a good deal of previous research …nds a trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stability when a given policy target is followed, we …nd considerable room for pareto improving outcomes. The only direct and permanent trade-o¤ that exists in our model is that between interest rate variability and the two indicators for business cycle stability -in ‡ation and output variability. An aggressive policy tack is not costless.
That policymakers encourage pareto improving (e¢cient) economic outcomes when they reduce the uncertainty that contributes to the forecast errors of …rms and citizens seems obvious. Indeed, there is empirical support for this sort of policymaker role. In their work on monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability for the United States , Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , …nd that aggressive policymakers are associated with more stable macroeconomic outcomes.
These …ndings are consistent with pareto improving outcomes when demand shocks occur. However, this role may be ill advised in the face of unexpected supply shocks. When supply shocks are present an aggressive policy tack eventually leads to trade-o¤s between in ‡ation and output stability.
While this paper focuses on the role of the policymaker, we do not endogenize this role to political forces. This is by design since our purpose is an examination of what role provides the optimal business cycle outcome. If it is the case that current price setting depends on future expectations, then a credible commitment to use countercyclical policies in the future improves business cycle performance. But, this requires endogenizing policymaker preferences to political forces. It is an obvious next step in building a more complete theory. In this vein, we believe the work of Bernhard (2001) and Morris (2000) among others are useful starting points.
We have also deliberately chosen a model of aggregate supply that uses informational confusion as the basis for price rigidity. 28 This allows for an expanded inquiry into the relationship between the citizenry and the policymakers. There is an extensive literature on monetary policy games (see Cukierman and Meltzer 1986) but we believe that an approach that allows for citizen and policymaker learning could provide new insights. This bears on a policymakers role since citizen learning has the potential to constrain policymaker autonomy. In this system we …rst solve for ¼ t . Simply combine equations (2:1) ; (2:2) and (2:3):
Note that E t y t+1 = y n t+1 from (2:1) and y n t+1 = ® +¯(t + 1) = ® +¯t +¯= y n t +¯: Collect terms:
Therefore,
where:
;
Using the method of undetermined coe¢cients, we can solve for the MSV asserting the solution takes the form:
with,
Now substitute (8:6) and (8:7) into (8:3) ; and solve for A and B:
Equation (8:3) is now:
The Variance of In ‡ation
According to equation (8:8), we have:
The variance then is:
Recall from (8:4):
(8.11)
The Variance of Output
To calculate the variance of the output level subtract the natural rate of output from both sides of (2:1):
Square both sides and take the theoretical expectation:
Substitute equation (8:4) into the previous equation:
The Variance of the Interest Rate
The variance of the interest rate is more complicated. Recall that the Taylor rule is:
The expression for in ‡ation (8:8) can be simpli…ed to:
where £ =
The output level expression (2.1) can be expressed as:
Now, substitute (8:14) and (8:15) into (8:13):
and take expectations:
The variance of the interest rate is:
or, 
Take the derivative with respect to c 2 :
Collect terms: 
Take the derivative with respect to c 1 :
and, 
